Looking into Brighton's transfers
What makes their recruitment so good? What can we try and learn from it? Where are other clubs going wrong when trying to mirror it?
After selling multiple first-team players and being forced to replace their manager mid-season, plenty of people could have excused Brighton for a lacklustre ‘transition season’. But instead, the Seagulls had their best season in the Premier League, qualifying for European competition, posting their best xGD figures and creating the 2nd most xG in the division. It goes without saying that the club, especially their recruitment process, has received a lot of praise.
The praise is more than justified; their recruitment has been great. There’s no way to detract from that. But, seeing the general discourse around Brighton, the perception of their recruitment has become somewhat warped. There seems a growing idea that they don’t miss. They’re incredible at spotting ‘wonderkids’ that they bring in and flip for profit.
And to some extent, they are. But I think it’s worth digging through their transfers and seeing if patterns emerge. Other clubs are attempting to mirror Brighton’s approach in the market but aren’t enjoying the same success. So, how can we determine Brighton's strategy, and what can other teams learn from them?
First, I’m basing a lot of assumptions about Brighton’s recruitment on general comments I’ve seen online, this Athletic article and this YouTube video and some points will overlap. Also, the latter two sources mention backroom staff changes, which I’m not knowledgeable about (or how they altered Brighton’s process). I assumed Tony Bloom is probably most important to their operations, rather than another staff member (when considering someone like Dan Ashworth joining in 2019 and leaving in 2022).
Second, it seems best to give an overview of their Premier League windows, look at how each signing has turned out and then move on to finding patterns and comparisons. It’s an elongated way of doing things, but it seems best.
Third, I’m using fees and information from TransferMarkt, which are all in Euros.
2017/18 Season
Looking at Brighton’s first Premier League window, it’s a rather mixed bag, but with plenty of hints about what’s to come. There’s a willingness to take risks on players outside the top five leagues and a tendency to sign first-team players at the ‘ready to explode’ age, around 22-25.
Jürgen Locadia may not have been a hit, but he had managed 0.79 npG + A per 90 across 7540 minutes for PSV at 24. You could accuse Brighton could be of some short-sightedness with the transfer, which is something you wouldn’t associate with them, as it seems they were willing to invest in a goalscorer mid-season after only scoring 17 goals in their first 22 Premier League matches (when the window opened). Locadia may not have had the desired effect, but taking the chance was understandable.
José Izquierdo was in a similar boat. He put in some performances that grabbed attention in a smaller league and was a good age, so you can see why Brighton took the gamble. Statbomb’s site has changed in the time since it was published, but from an article looking at wingers for Arsenal in 2017/18, Ted Knutson mentioned Izquierdo and said:
Izquierdo is a tiny Colombian whose game scouts a bit like a discount Alexis. He's been on the "Interesting" list for a few years now. Shooting locations could use some work, but the rest of his game is probably good enough for a move to the Premier League.
Odds are, if StatsBomb had a player on an “interesting” list for a couple of seasons, Tony Bloom’s super secret algorithm would have also noticed them. Again, it may not have worked out, but considering his figures, age, and the Statsbomb cosign, you can see why Brighton were willing to take a chance.
Davy Pröpper and Mat Ryan were more successful. The former played 3119, 2546 and 2829 minutes in his first three Premier League seasons, while the latter was the first-choice goalkeeper for three seasons. They both left on a free but played a role in the first team. You’d probably consider them average to good but not great transfers. They did their job in a ~unspectacular way and moved on for nothing. Had they either a) been really good or b) sold for a profit or c) got a fee, they could probably be considered good to great transfers.
The next three transfers are perhaps where the ideas about Brighton only signing kids or players to develop start to meet opposition. I’ll get into it more during the summary, but it feels like Brighton (since being in the Premier League) have never only been interested in signing young players. Both Suttner and Pascal Groß likely represented good value after Ingolstadt were relegated. Groß has probably been one of the best Premier League transfers of the last ~ten years when considering value for money, but he wasn’t some unknown. He had been mentioned in StatsBomb articles a few times during the 2016/17 season. Taking a chance on such a player for such a fee and still only 26 years old seems worth doing — even if just for his set-piece-taking ability.
Ezequiel Schelotto and Tim Krul added some depth and experience to the squad. Schelotto played 1318 Premier League minutes and later left on a free, while Krul never made a Premier League appearance and left on a free.
After these first-team signings, clearly made to enhance the first team and ensure they didn’t drop straight back into the Championship, Brighton also signed four kids from smaller nations/leagues. And this seems to be where you can see their approach of taking small risks on younger players from smaller nations/leagues begin. They signed them for small fees after they likely signalled something interesting in the data, making them minimal-risk signings. If they develop into first-team players, it’s great. If not, you’ve lost next to nothing, with little impact on the first team.
Despite Viktor Gyökeres now looking like a great talent and being linked with a ~£20m move to the Premier League, none of those players worked out for Brighton. None made a single Premier League appearance. However, they spent ~€5.5m on them and recouped €4.7m (not including the possibility of loan fees). It’s a case of nothing gained, nothing lost. Had Gyökeres exploded during his loan spell rather than after moving permanently, Brighton could have brought him back into the first team and likely gotten praise for having found and developed another obscure talent.
2018/19 Season
Despite their signings being somewhat of a mixed bag in their first Premier League season, Brighton must have believed in what they were doing as their second-season transfers were similar to their first season’s.
Their main first-team signings were the ‘ready to explode’ age, although they only signed one of these players from a smaller league — although this could have been due to the players/deals available rather than a move away from a league.
Alireza Jahanbakhsh was the biggest signing, coming after a monster season with AZ Alkmaar scoring 17 non-penalty goals and assisting 12. Across 6726 minutes with AZ Alkmaar, he maintained 0.72 npG + A per 90. Like with Locadia and Izquierdo, he couldn’t reproduce his figures for Brighton. He only scored 2 Premier League goals and only played 1020, 311 and 528 Premier League minutes in each season. Brighton sold him for €1m in July 2021. It was another miss, both for performance and recouping their money, but given his performance and age, no one can blame Brighton for taking the chance.
Yves Bissouma was a promising prospect at Lille, getting some mentions from a few people on Twitter and into football analytics at the time, causing some excitement over the transfer. Bissouma became a key player in the Brighton side and garnered Brighton some profit when Tottenham signed him €29.2m in 2022. He’s perhaps the first example of Brighton’s buy young → develop → profit strategy for post-Premier League signings.
Bernardo was quite an odd signing, even at the time (looking back at this piece by Ashwin Raman). Nothing he did jumped off the page, but he had managed a decent number of minutes and was young and versatile (if I remember correctly). He made little impact and eventually left for nothing or a nominal fee.
Skipping Alexis Mac Allister for a moment, Brighton signed Martín Montoya from Valencia. Like Schelotto and Suttner, this seemed a depth or ‘he’ll do a job’ signing. He played 2167 minutes and 1896 minutes, then left on a free. Peak age, a small fee and a short-term contract, he seemed to offer depth and be a stop-gap option but nothing more.
Florin Andone was a fun signing. Playing for a relegated Deportivo La Coruña side, Andone had the 5th highest npxG per 90 in La Liga — behind Cristiano Ronaldo, Lionel Messi, Luis Suárez and Wissam Ben Yedder. Sure, he underperformed, but at 25 years old, available for €6m, and Brighton had poor attacking figures and struggled to score: why not take the risk? It’s likely a player with similar figures, in a similar league and a similar age, would have been much more expensive.
David Button was likely a backup/depth signing and home-grown, while Dan Burn was perhaps a more odd signing. He’s older than Brighton have typically gone for from smaller leagues, but they must have spotted something in him. They signed him for €3.55m and loaned him back to Wigan. He returned to Brighton and earned a regular starting spot before being sold for ~€15m in January 2022.
Percy Tau was another strange signing. Like Burn, he was older than you’d expect Brighton to sign, considering the league he was playing in. Brighton recouped €1.8m of his €3.2m fee after he played just 103 Premier League minutes.
Brighton also signed Leon Balogun and Jason Steele on frees to bolster the squad. Balogun had injury problems (even before joining) and only played 594 minutes before leaving on a free, while Steele has recently become the starting goalkeeper. Another two ‘they’ll do a job’/provide some depth type of signings — with the twist of Steele becoming #1 a few years later.
Which leaves us with six kids. Alexis Mac Allister, Jan Mlakar, Tudor Băluță, Anders Dreyer, Billy Arce and Leo Östigard.
Nothing needs to be said about Alexis Mac Allister, but we perhaps should note that he wasn’t some obscure talent. Ashwin Raman wrote a Twitter thread about how he had interesting numbers in August 2018 (he joined Brighton in January 2019). But I’ll talk a bit more about this later.
Mlakar joined Fiorentina at a young age before moving back to Slovenia. He managed 3G + 6A in 563 minutes in 2017/18 before scoring 13 and assisting 2 in 1757 minutes in 2018/19. Brighton signed him in January 2019 and loaned him back to Maribor. 0.93 G + A per 90 for a 19/20-year-old across 2320 minutes is impressive, and Brighton deemed it worth the €3m gamble.
Tudor Băluță was playing regularly for Viitorul aged 18/19 in the Romanian League. He first came to my attention when looking for players in ‘different’ leagues in October 2018 (he also joined Brighton in January). They signed him for €2.9m. He left on a free in July 2022, having never made a Premier League appearance.
Billy Arce left on a free, having never made a Premier League appearance. He managed 0.47 npG per 90 across 3268 minutes in 2017 and 2018 for Independiente, having only just turned 20 in June 2018. For €860,000, why not take the risk he could be a decent prospect?
Anders Dreyer seems an interesting signing. He managed ~1 G+A per 90 for Esbjerg in the Danish 2nd division in 2017/18, when he would have been 19. Despite the great figures, €2.2m seems like it’d be the upper end of a speculative punt on a 19-year-old in the Danish 2nd division. Despite it not working out at Brighton, as he didn’t make a Premier League appearance and only fetched €1m from Midtjylland, after a couple of solid seasons with the Danish club, they sold him for €7m to Rubin Kazan. You could almost class him as a smaller-scale Viktor Gyökeres. Brighton may not have profited from the player, but they helped someone else.
Finally, Leo Østigård joined for a measly €110k after playing ~900 minutes as an 18-year-old in Norway. He had some productive loan spells, in the sense he played lots of minutes, in the 2. Bundesliga, Championship and Serie A before Napoli signed him for €5m in July 2022. He only made three Serie A starts for Napoli this season, but he’s still only 23, and that’s a great ROI for Brighton.
Looking only at the kids, and excluding Alexis Mac Allister as he’s still there, they spent ~€9m and recouped €6m — again not including the possibility of loan fees. They’re making constant small gambles with potentially high rewards. But we’re not done yet.
2019/20 Season
2019 was the first transfer window with Graham Potter and Dan Ashworth. After two seasons in the Premier League, the assumption would be that Brighton now wanted to kick on and become a midtable/top-half side. And their signings seem to mean business. They didn’t sign a group of kids but instead focused on the first team and, again, that ‘ready to explode’ age.
Adam Webster signed from Bristol City for a club record ~€22m, aged 24. There’s a possibility that Brighton wanted centre-backs more comfortable on the ball to suit Potter’s style and identified Webster (looking on FBRef, he had strong figures for Progressive Passes and Carries, had a lot of touches (suggesting he’s comfortable on the ball/can build from the back) and had good aerial stats).
Neal Maupay, another Championship player, joined after a great season with Brentford. Only 22, he had an npxG + xA of 0.71 per 90 in his final season and an actual npG + A of 0.67 across his two seasons in the division. Maupay did a fair job of leading the line for Brighton. Under Potter, Brighton tended to underperform their xG and be quite low-scoring, so he didn’t set the world alight, but you’d say he was a good but not great signing. Great would be if he scored more and/or sealed a move for a profit rather than being sold for ~€4m less after a few seasons of good service.
Delving back into the Belgian League for a left-sided attacker, not scarred by their experience with Izquierdo, Brighton signed Leandro Trossard from KRC Genk for ~€15m. I mentioned Trossard as an option for Arsenal in May 2019, making it fun to see him join now. At the time, I saw him as a similar option to Alex Iwobi on the left (he can carry/cut inside and create/be a good link player), but with more goal threat. Like Izquierdo, Locadia and Jahanbakhsh, he had good numbers in a smaller league and was a good age, making it seem worth the risk. Across 7735 minutes in the Belgian top division, he maintained an npG + A of 0.56 per 90 playing for two different clubs. Finally, for Brighton, it was a move that paid off. He became an important player, contributed in attack, and they eventually sold him for a profit — albeit a reduced profit given he only had 18 months left on his contract and seemed to force a move.
Matt Clarke joined for €3.9m before being loaned out to Championship clubs and eventually sold for a small loss to Middlesbrough. He never made a Premier League appearance.
Aaron Mooy was brought in as an older/do-a-job type signing, like plenty before him, for just €3.3m. He played 2085 minutes before being sold for a small profit to Shanghai Port. Probably the best-case scenario for such a transfer. They come in, do their job and are sold for a profit — making way either for a young player to step up or another stop-gap option.
Tariq Lamptey joined from Chelsea for €1.2m and looked like a great signing, but has struggled with injuries. He’s still only 22, so there’s still an opportunity for him to turn it around either at Brighton or for Brighton to recoup their fee. Given the hype surrounding him when he broke into the side, you’d imagine a side would gamble at least ~€1m on him unless he opts to run down his contract.
Overall, 2019/20 was a good window for Brighton. The players brought in to help the first team all made an impact and were sold for fair values.
2020/21 Season
After a year’s break, Brighton were back signing youngsters in 2020/21. Starting with the first-team signings, they added some Premier League experience with Adam Lallana and Danny Welbeck joining on frees, while Joël Veltman joined for €1m from Ajax.
I’ll go into more detail later, but these are the signings that I think are underrated from Brighton. All three have been useful players, playing ~1500 minutes a season in the case of Lallana and Welbeck and 2000+ for Veltman. Coming through at Ajax, Veltman is comfortable on the ball for Brighton’s build-up play and fairly versatile. Paying €1m for a player who plays a significant number of minutes for a ~midtable Premier League side is good going.
Then, with those three impacting the first team, Brighton also added five players aged 21 or younger. Jakub Moder, Michal Karbownik, Moisés Caicedo, Andi Zeqiri and Jan Paul van Hecke.
Moder spent a season on loan in the Polish 2nd division when he was ~19, playing 2190 minutes. Back at Lech Poznan the following season, he played 1492 minutes in the Ekstraklasa, scoring 5 and assisting 5 — 0.60 G + A per 90 from central/defensive midfield (according to TransferMarkt). Then, in 2019/20, Moder managed 0.44 G+A from 1214 minutes.
Across the two seasons, Moder maintained 0.53 G + A per 90 from 2706 minutes playing mostly in midfield. He also played ~700 minutes in the Europa League (incl. qualifying) and hadn't yet turned 21.
Brighton must have rated this performance highly to pay €11m for him and throw him right into the first team — not sending him out on loan. He played 647 Premier League minutes in his first season and 1701 in his second. Unfortunately, he’s been out with a long-term injury, making it interesting to see if he’ll be introduced into Roberto de Zerbi’s side (particularly as they’ll likely need midfield depth/options) or loaned out for regular minutes to regain his fitness.
Brighton also signed Moder’s compatriot Michal Karbownik in the same window for half the price. In 2019/20, 18-year-old Karbownik broke into the Legia Warsawa team and assisted 7 goals from 2369 minutes while playing mostly left-back (TransferMarkt says 7 assists, FBRef says 5). He hasn’t made a Premier League appearance but had an unproductive loan spell with Olympiakos (388 minutes) before playing 1850 minutes for Düsseldorf in the 2. Bundesliga this season. Next season he’ll likely go on loan again unless he’s deemed able to deputy Pervis Estupiñán, particularly with the Seagulls having more fixtures next season.
Nothing needs to be said about Moisés Caicedo. However, in 2020 he played 1519 minutes in the league for Independiente across 22 matches and 317 minutes across 6 Libertadores matches. He turned 19 in November 2020, so most of these minutes would have come as an 18-year-old. He was loaned out to Beerschot V.A. in 2021/22 and played 756 minutes before playing 664 Premier League minutes in the second half of the season. There is an argument that Caicedo has had to step up quicker than first thought after Brighton sold Bissouma before losing Enock Mwepu unexpectedly (Perhaps playing as a depth option behind those two this season). Unless his performances in Belgium were enough to make the club believe he could play a role in the first team.
Like Anders Dreyer, Andi Zeqiri was quite a speculative buy for €4m considering most of his senior experience came in the Swiss second division. Across 3169 minutes in the 2018/19 and 2019/20 seasons, Zeqiri contributed 0.97 G + A per 90, turning 21 in June 2020. Since signing, he’s made 9 Premier League substitute appearances and has had a couple of loans. His loan spell at Augsburg wasn’t the most productive, but back in Switzerland this season, he’s managed 11 goals and 2 assists in 1648 minutes with Basel (0.71 G+A per 90). It wouldn’t be too surprising if Basel signed him permanently based on those figures for a ~breakeven price — if Brighton deem him unlikely to enter the first-team fold.
Finally, Brighton spent €2m on Jan Paul van Hecke. He played 2323 Eredivisie minutes in 2020/21, turning 21 in June 2021. Brighton sent him on loan to Blackburn in 2021/22, and he played 2646 Championship minutes. He’s even played 295 Premier League minutes this season, in addition to some cup appearances.
As we get closer to the present day, the futures of the kids Brighton sign are still unresolved, making it hard to judge. From the above, Caicedo is an obvious hit. Moder was promising until the injury, Karbownik and Jan Paul van Hecke look promising after some productive loan spells, while Zeqiri looks like a miss but not a costly one.
2021/22 Season
In the 2021/22 season, Brighton added a couple of first-team players at the ‘ready to explode’ age, a couple of kids and a couple of interesting signings.
Enock Mwepu joined for €23m from RB Salzburg. Having been in the Red Bull system since at least 2017/18, playing for FC Liefering, it’s needless to say he was young but with plenty of minutes under his belt, including in continental competition. A heart condition forced him into early retirement, but I was quite surprised to see he only played 996 Premier League minutes in 2021/22. There seemed to be a lot of praise for him, making it seem he played a more significant role. Of course, given his forced early retirement, it’s impossible to judge this transfer.
Marc Cucurella signing for €18m seemed a real coup for Brighton. Cucurella came through at Barcelona but impressed in Spain playing for managers like José Bordalás and José Luis Mendilibar, known more for playing high-intensity football in a ~4-4-2 shape. It seems that history of structured possession play coming through the ranks at Barcelona, but senior experience with a different style, made him an interesting proposition. He was adept offering natural width on the left, getting up and down the touchline, playing left-back and left-midfield, but at Brighton he even played like a third centre-back, comfortable in possession at the back. Just for the sheer profit of the transfer, it’s obvious this was a success.
Brighton again spent €11m on a Polish talent, this time 18-year-old Kacper Kozlowski from Pogon Szczecin. Kozlowski played 1066 Ekstraklasa minutes as a 17-year-old in 2020/21 before playing 925 minutes the following half-season (Brighton signed him in January). He averaged 0.50 G + A per 90 across the 1991 minutes. He spent the second half of 2021/22 on loan in Belgium with Tony Bloom’s Belgian sidepiece (Union SG) and 2022/23 on loan at Vitesse. TransferMarkt has him splitting his time between central midfield and the left wing. He hasn’t been as productive ~0.30 G + A per 90, but it still seems a positive loan spell.
Brighton spent €8m on Abdallah Sima after he scored 11 goals and assisted 5 as a 19-year-old playing in the Fortuna Liga (0.99 G+A per 90). He had an unproductive loan spell at Stoke during 2021/22, playing just 73 minutes, before playing 1742 minutes for Angers in Ligue 1 this season, scoring 5 and assisting 2 (FBRef says assisting 1, TransferMarkt says 2). Averaging 0.35 npxG + xA per 90 for a side that finished last and had poor underlying figures isn’t terrible, but you’d expect it’s not enough for Sima to enter the Brighton first-team fold, and they may want him to have another loan spell where he plays a higher percentage of minutes and delivers more.
Deniz Undav was quite an interesting signing, in the same kind of mould as Dan Burn. He’s a bit older than you would expect Brighton to go for in the Belgian league, especially considering they loaned him back to Union SG for the second half of 2021/22 rather than have him come straight into the first team. But he had an absolutely monster season, scoring 25 and assisting 9, with an npG + A of 0.97 per 90, coming off the back of 0.80 per 90 in the previous season in the second division (and 0.90 the season before that in the German third division). In a tiny number of Premier League minutes (628), he’s managed an npxG + xA of 0.80 per 90 and an actual rate of 0.72 per 90. If he can maintain those figures across an increased number of minutes (even if not starting every single game), he’ll be a great signing and almost a bit of a late bloomer at the top level.
Brighton signed young goalkeeper Kjell Scherpen from Ajax for €5m. Scherpen likely got the attention of Ajax after playing 34 Eredivisie matches for FC Emmen in 2018/19, when he would have only turned 19 in January 2019. He didn’t feature much for the Ajax senior side, but Brighton thought he was worth a gamble. He didn’t play much on loan at Oostende but has played 26 matches for Vitesse this season. His shot-stopping figures have been below average, but he’s strong at claiming crosses — although that maybe shouldn’t be a surprise given he's 6’8”(!!).
Like Burn and Undav, Kaoru Mitoma fits into the bracket of being a bit older than you’d think Brighton would go for the league the player is from. Mitoma was 24 when Brighton spent €3m on him in the summer of 2021. But when a player averages 1.14 npG + A per 90 over 2832 minutes, as Mitoma did in 2020 and 2021 in the J1 League, you can see why spending €3m is worth the gamble. On loan at Tony Bloom’s Belgian sidepiece, Mitoma averaged 0.61 npG + A per 90 in 1186 minutes. This figure isn’t far from his npxG + xA of 0.56 per 90 in the Premier League this season. He’s stepped up and made it so Brighton haven’t missed Trossard, which isn’t a small feat considering how important the Belgian international felt to Brighton’s attack in the past.
Finally, Brighton added Jeremy Sarmiento for ? from Benfica. Still only 20, they seem to be nurturing his development and keeping him close to the club. Maybe he'll be sent on loan for regular minutes next season?
In 2021/22, Brighton signed another quite interesting batch of players. Mwepu looked promising but didn’t play all that often before being forced into retirement. Mitoma and Undav were small gambles on slightly older players (for the league) that seem to have paid off. Cucurella more than paid off. You’d expect the likes of Sima, Kozlowski and Scherpen to have another loan next season unless they're deemed good depth options for the extra fixtures and represent better value than a new signing.
2022/23 Season
At last, we reach the present day.
The Pervis Estupiñán transfer was weird in the same way the Cucurella transfer was weird. Which is fitting, given he was his replacement. Cucurella was highly rated, had played for a team in European competition, and was linked to big clubs, yet cost just €18m. Estupiñán impressed with Osasuna, moved to Villarreal and continued to impress, including playing a part in helping their Champions League run to the semi-finals, yet cost just €17.8m. He’s been a success, but it’s odd how little he and Cucurella cost considering their high profile and links.
If Cucurella and Estupiñán were confusing because their fee seemed low, Julio Enciso costing €11.6m levels things out a bit. It’s probably more than you’d expect an 18-year-old in the Paraguayan league to cost. But when that 18-year-old has already played 3505 senior league minutes and maintained 0.56 npG + A per 90 across them, it becomes more understandable. Especially when the second season saw him progress to 0.92 npG + A per 90. He’s even made an immediate impact in the Premier League. He’s got 0.64 npxG + xA per 90 and 0.67 npG + A per 90 in his first 806 Premier League minutes.
Billy Gilmour joined for €8.33m from Chelsea. Despite feeling like he’s been around for a while and has played in some big international matches, he’s still only 21. It’s a bit of a free hit for Brighton, given the Cucurella deal. If you view the Cucurella deal as €8.33m less plus Gilmour, rather than seeing them as two separate cash deals, Brighton still made a huge profit and gained a promising young midfielder. Even if he doesn’t progress beyond a useful depth option for a couple of years (he only played 507 Premier League minutes this season), it’s still not a bad deal for Brighton.
Simon Adingra cost €8m after a promising season with Nordsjælland. He turned 20 in January 2022 and managed 0.60 npG + A per 90 in 1809 minutes. More impressive, playing for Tony Bloom’s Belgian sidepiece this season, Adringa has 0.90 npG + A per 90 this season from 1905 minutes. Adringa has split his time between the left wing and striker position this season, according to TransferMarkt. Considering the impressive performances of Mitoma, Undav, and Enciso, plus the experience of Welbeck and the emergence of Evan Ferguson, it’ll be interesting to see if Adringa is brought into the first-team fold or loaned out to a team in a higher-reputation league.
Facundo Buonanotte didn’t have huge goalscoring figures for Rosario Central in Argentina, but given their poor showing, scoring just 24 goals in 27 games, a 17-year-old playing 1825 minutes, scoring 4 goals and assisting another 3, isn’t bad going. For €6m, you can understand why Brighton were happy to take the risk.
Finally, Brighton spent €4m on Yasin Ayari. He turned 19 at the end of the 2022 season, where he played 1435 minutes and contributed 0.31 npG + A per 90 from central midfield. Depending on what happens in the summer, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Brighton loan him to a side in a division stronger than the Allsvenskan next season — unless they deem it better for his development to keep him at the club rather than gain more minutes. Being sent to Union SG could be an option.
But there’s more…
Reading the above, I didn't mention some high-profile players. Ben White fetched a massive fee from Arsenal, Robert Sánchez grew in profile and earned a call-up to the Spain national team, and Evan Ferguson made an impact in the first team this season and has been linked with a big-money move already.
On TransferMarkt, Brighton U21s and U18s also have pages. While I’m not going to go through each of those here, you can see that they’re also dipping into the market for younger players. They signed Ben White as a 16-year-old from Southampton, Robert Sánchez as a 16-year-old from Levante, and Evan Ferguson as a 16-year-old from Bohemians. And that’s not all…
Looking at just their record transfers for the U21 side and U18 side, they’ve signed quite a few young Irish players, with the most high-profile being Ferguson, Aaron Connolly and Jayson Molumby. They’ve paid fees for young lower-league players (17-year-old Solly March and 18-year-old Steven Alzate from non-league sides), they’ve paid fees for players from further afield (17-year-old Peter Gwargis from Sweden’s second division, 19-year-old Ulrick Eneme-Ella from Ligue 2, 17-year-old Cameron Peupion from Australia). They’ve also paid fees for prospects from top English clubs, with Tariq Lamptey an example already mentioned and €1.1m on 18-year-old Taylor Richards from Manchester City.
Scrolling through the free transfers, they’ve signed players from clubs like Dortmund, PSG and Real Madrid and nations like Belgium, Finland and Norway.
It seems likely Brighton don't see all these players as future first-team players, but they always seem to be searching for talent and value from all nations and age groups. If a player does take off and become a genuine prospect, it’s great. Just look at March, White, Sánchez and Ferguson. If they don’t, the losses are negligible.
Let’s try and bring all of this together…
The above was meant to be a quick rundown, with some background information, before getting into the meat of the piece. Given how long I spent yammering on about inane things, I’ll try not to go on too much here. I’d argue there are a few patterns that emerge from the above. This is a quick rundown, which I’ll dig into more afterwards.
For all the talk of Tony Bloom’s super secret algorithm, most of the more obscure or left-field signings tended to be players playing a lot at a very young age and/or having high goal contributions (at least relative to their position/team). Finding these players doesn’t seem hard. Give a kid a WyScout subscription or bunch of stats and they could likely find them too (Exhibit A: Ashwin Raman making a thread about 19-year-old Alexis Mac Allister after getting his hands on some Argentinian data)
Brighton have done a great job signing cheaper, more experienced options. Whether it’s players on a free like Welbeck and Lallana or those for cheap like Suttner, Groß and Veltman. These players come in and do a decent job for an ~average side. They may not always be a net positive player, but they never feel like a net negative player. If a player comes in, performs at a neutral/general team level, then moves on and makes way for either an improvement or a developing young player with a higher ceiling, it’s hard to complain. It’s also an understated and underrated part of their recruitment and one it feels like most teams trying to mirror Brighton miss.
Saying Brighton look for value is somewhat redundant. No team goes into a window talking about how they want to find deals that represent terrible value. But, it feels less about youth/age (or nation/league) for Brighton and more about value, with young players representing value because of their potential. Given how wide they’ve cast their net, both in geography and age, I’d be hard-pressed to say they have a type, and it seems more like their type is anyone who represents good value. They’re not going to turn their nose up if that’s someone in the Swiss second division, someone a little older than you might expect or someone with an injury history (think Balogun and Welbeck). How many Premier League sides would be open to signing players from such a wide range of leagues? There are probably Championship sides who would turn their nose up at a player performing well in the Swiss second division, believing they won’t carry their performance over.
Favourable factors that allow for their approach, namely:
A wide margin for error
Little expectation/short-term urgency (although that may be coming to an end)
Shorter pathway to the first team than some clubs
Premier League money
A growing reputation for their strategy (although this is an earned factor)
Replacing players before they sell them. It’s an old rule from Soccernomics, but it seems like clubs rarely follow it. Brighton seem to have a conveyor belt of talent. Collecting young players and adding the odd bit of experience, it seems (with the exception of Cucurella → Estupiñán) Brighton’s signings haven’t felt like a direct replacement for an outgoing player. It doesn’t feel like they enter deals with the other side knowing they have some leverage because Brighton need their player. It also feels like (with the stop-gap signings) they have a planned pathway for players. They might sign a new midfielder who can do a job for a couple of seasons while signing/looking to sign/already having some in the 18-21 age range who can enter the first-team fold at the end of the stop-gap option’s contract. If they’re not ready, there’s always the possibility of another stop-gap option.
Some of their reputation is a matter of perception. They’ve done great things, but presenting them as never wrong and a side that can see into the future and sign tomorrow’s talent today doesn’t sit right with me. Their hits are memorable, while their misses fade into oblivion. Everyone will pay attention when a Mitoma/Mac Allister/Caicedo hits, but no one cares when a Mateju/Mlakar/Zeqiri/Băluță misses. Combined with the low-risk strategy (considering the fees of most of the players), only a relegation would likely call their recruitment into question. Of course, they’ve headed in the opposite direction, shooting up the table and qualifying for Europe, and rightly deserve praise. But even if they finished between 9th and 15th each season, they’d probably avoid strong criticism — at least from neutrals (which links with the idea of #4).
Expanding on the above points, the first sounds a bit snarky, but it contains truth. Finding young players who are playing often and performing some KPI at a high level is as easy as having a bunch of data and being able to filter it. Determining which players could a) transfer these performances to a higher level or b) are worth investing in (and how much you should invest in them) is much more difficult. Noticing Mitoma putting up ridiculous numbers isn’t hard. The challenge is determining whether a Premier League club should buy him and how much they should spend on him based on his performances in the J1 League.
Looking at the above, the description of ‘young player (<= 21), playing a significant number of minutes (>= ~900) and putting up good G + A numbers for their position/team/age (varies)’ likely fits:
Viktor Gyökeres (18, 2391 minutes in Swedish second division, 0.68 npG + A per 90)
Soufyan Ahannach (21, 6076 minutes in Dutch second division, 0.71 npG + A per 90)
Alexis Mac Allister (20, 2857 minutes in the Argentinian league across two seasons with a poor to average side, 0.41 npG + A per 90 from midfield)
Jan Mlakar (20, 2320 minutes across a season and a half, 0.93 G+A per 90)
Anders Dreyer (20, 2324 minutes in the Danish 2nd division,~1 G+A per 90)
Billy Arce (20, 3268 minutes, 0.47 npG per 90 — not as impressive figures but tiny fee (<€1m) and large minutes)
Jakub Moder (21, 2706 minutes across two seasons, G+A of 0.53 per 90 from playing mostly in midfield)
Michal Karbownik (19, 2369 minutes, 0.27 assists per 90 from left-back)
Andi Zeqiri (21, 3169 minutes across two seasons in the Swiss second division, 0.97 G+A per 90)
Kacper Kozlowski (18, 1991 minutes across a season and a half, 0.50 G+A per 90 from midfield)
Abdallah Sima (20, 1456 minutes in the league, 0.99 G+A per 90 [also had 0.64 G+A per 90 from 707 Europa League minutes])
Julio Enciso (18, 1173 minutes in final season, 0.92 npG + A per 90, 3505 minutes and 0.56 npG + A per 90 overall)
Simon Adringa (20, 1809 minutes, 0.60 npG + A per 90)
Facundo Buonanotte (18, 1825 minutes, 0.35 npG + A per 90 — these figures aren’t as impressive but given a) how young he was plus b) how low-scoring his team was, he could probably slip through some kind of relative filter)
Yasin Ayari (19, 1435 minutes, 0.31 npG + A per 90 from central midfield)
That’s 15/26 of their signings of players 21 or under since being in the Premier League. For the remaining eleven, you have two right-backs, five defensive-minded/build-up-oriented midfielders, two centre-backs, a goalkeeper and Jeremy Sarmiento. But this isn’t considering other KPIs or underlying numbers, which may be better for deeper players or finding value.
However, there is a problem when looking at things this way. These players obviously had strong figures. That’s why Brighton noticed them. Looking back and seeing they had strong figures is somewhat redundant. What would be more interesting is seeing other players who fit the filters for the same seasons and trying to see what made Brighton choose the players they did.
Imagine when searching in 2018 if you had a midfielder in a comparable league to the Argentinian league and similar figures to Alexis Mac Allister. What would make you choose Mac Allister instead? What would make you determine that Mac Allister would be worth x amount? And that investing x in Mac Allister is better than investing y into the other option? Despite the talent ID often getting praise, the initial identification seems much easier than these questions.
This leads us to point #2 and where I think clubs go wrong when trying to mirror Brighton’s success and the misconception of it. Here’s a quote from the article about Brighton’s recruitment, published before the FA Cup semi-final in The Athletic:
Gareth Jennings, formerly head of technical development at FIFA following spells as academy director at Leicester City and Stoke City, says: “There are three levels for the recruitment of players: recruiting players for the now, recruiting for now and for the future, then just for the future.
“They don’t really touch the players for the now scenario. Look at the signings in January – (Facundo) Buonanotte from Rosario Central for £6million for an 18-year-old (Argentinian) with huge potential.
“He’s got that capability to be in and around the squad now, but he’s one for the future. Yasin Asari (19) from Sweden for £4million; again, huge potential.
“They’ve got this really good balance in terms of understanding the type of players they want to bring in that fit into the way they play.”
I’m not sure I could disagree with the quote more after running through Brighton’s transfers. I’d argue their signings 'for the now' are equally important as their signings 'for the now and the future' or 'for the future'. They’re all pieces of the jigsaw, and all the pieces matter.
If we’re crude in our definitions for a moment, we’ll say <= 21 is a young player (for the future), 22-25 is the ‘ready to explode’ age (for the now and for the future) and >= 26 are older (for the now) players. What league they joined from and the fee involved would also be deemed important for their status, but that doesn’t seem a bad, albeit crude, guideline. With the above guideline, according to my little spreadsheet, 23.2% of Brighton’s signings since being in the Premier League have been in ‘for the now’ category. With a median of 8 signings per season, that’s ~2 signings per season ‘for the now’.
I concede that these signings have dwindled, with none coming in the past two seasons. But I’d also argue this is because they haven’t needed them, rather than an aversion to players in this age bracket. Going into 2021/22, they had Adam Lallana, Pascal Groß, Danny Welbeck, Joël Veltman, Lewis Dunk, Shane Duffy, Dan Burn, Solly March, Leandro Trossard and Adam Webster, all >= 26. Then, they had Jakub Moder, Alexis Mac Allister, Robert Sánchez, Yves Bissouma and Neal Maupay in the ‘ready to explode’ category. Considering the squad composition, adding to the ‘ready to explode’ category with players able to come straight into the first team while still having room to grow makes sense.
It’s a point I think clubs miss when trying to mirror Brighton (and starts to lean into point #3). Brighton don’t just sign kids; they sign value. If a player is what you need, that provides value, and Brighton often buy what they need. Furthermore, they’re open to taking speculative gambles on high-performing young players from just about anywhere.
I’ve seen grumbles from Leeds fans online, complaining about their recruitment and how it seems like they’re trying to mirror Brighton, signing kids to develop and make a profit with. But there are a couple of key differences that I think have been to Leeds’ detriment (which probably isn’t a hard argument to make after their relegation).
Leeds have had three seasons in the Premier League. They haven’t signed a player >= 26 since their first window. They signed 29-year-old Rodrigo for €30m, 27-year-old Diego Llorente for €20m and 26-year-old Hélder Costa for €17.7m.
A couple of things stand out from the above. It’s hard to say these players offer good value. All the fees seem inflated for their ages and profile. The first two give the impression they were players Marcelo Bielsa admired and wanted to add to his squad, and the club were happy to back him given he won promotion (but that’s just speculation on my part). Then, they don’t seem like the smart/low fee/short contract older buys you’d expect from someone like Brighton.
Not signing an older player in the next two seasons seems odd. Was there not a single position Leeds could have benefitted from a short-term boost in? Even for depth? What about a short-term contract for an older striker to cover for Bamford’s injuries rather than expecting a kid to step up?
There is the caveat that Leeds favoured a very high-intensity approach under Bielsa and Jesse Marsch, needing fitter and more mobile players, which lends itself to younger players. But it’s hard to imagine there were no 26-29-year-olds available who could do a job in the short term.
Then, while lots of Leeds’ signings fit the general profile of younger players, playing significant minutes and having good goal contribution figures (at least for attacking players), with the lack of older signings combined with injuries to more experienced Leeds players, there was a pressure for almost all of these to hit the ground running. A pressure that compounds when considering the fees.
Except for Wilfried Gnonto, most of the fees were what you’d associate with first-team signings rather than speculative punts. They paid >= €25m for Daniel James, Luis Sinisterra, Georginio Rutter and Brenden Aaronson. It’s hard to a) argue that those deals represent good value or b) that was the best use of >€75m (they signed Dan James the year before) for a side who finished on 38 points and had the 3rd worst xGD in the division.
If the trio hit it off, we'd be praising what great signings they were, but a) What's the probability of all three delivering for a struggling side? and b) Is it high enough to warrant a €75m risk/investment?
It’s comparable to Brighton finishing 17th on 36 points in 2018/19, but you could argue Trossard and Maupay looked better poised to add to their attack given their impressive figures elsewhere and represented better value (they cost ~the same combined as Brenden Aaronson did, not accounting for inflation). Brighton also changed manager, which they likely viewed as another factor that could steer them up the table.
To be crude, where Brighton’s approach feels like considered gambles, Leeds’ felt more like throwing lots of money at high-performing young players. Brighton’s transfers almost feel like a betting model, using some kind of EV model or Kelly’s criterion. They seem happy to take the chance on long shots if they believe they have a positive EV (though how they determine this is the more interesting part, which I’ll speculate on later).
It’s not like the players Leeds signed are bad. But a lot of the prices seem inflated, and it’s asking a lot for ~10 young players to hit the ground running in a new league or country. Looking through the transfers, it doesn’t seem like Brighton have expected such a large number of younger players to all make significant first-team contributions so soon. Then, considering Leeds lost Raphinha and Kalvin Phillips while other established players had injury problems, not adding more immediate improvement seems odd. Although, I like the signings of Marc Roca and Tyler Adams, who both represented good value for their age, experience and ability.
It’s even comparable to Wolves this season. Despite Julen Lopetegui coming in and putting points on the board, Wolves’ underlying figures are horrific, and plenty of their recruitment has been subpar since their first Premier League window. They shouldn’t be used as a positive example. But, the signings of experienced players like Craig Dawson, Mario Lemina and Pablo Sarabia in January all made an immediate impact and cost a combined ~ €20m, and you kind of wonder if Leeds had made 2/3 signings of the same profile, those who could come in for a low fee, probably a short-term contract, but be in a position to offer an instant impact and take some pressure off the kids, could that have helped them gain the points necessary to stay up? (Thinking about it, those three players could have been useful for Leeds. Sarabia could have added some attacking output, Lemina could have come in when Adams was injured and bolstered the midfield, and Dawson helped add some experience and physical/aerial presence at the back).
This misconception that Brighton don’t sign players for the now leans into point #3, with the misconception that Brighton have a type (young, South American?). The below table groups their signings by league, showing the number of signings from each league as well as the mean and median fee and age.
A couple of things emerge.
The Premier League and Bundesliga are the places they went for experienced players. They have the highest ages but low fees (the Bundesliga fee would be much lower without Bernardo).
The Eredivisie interest seems to have cooled in recent seasons after the initial burst of signing Locadia, Pröpper and Jahanbakhsh. Their more recent signings have been young prospects (Jan Paul van Hecke and Kjell Scherpen) and Veltman, who was 28 and cost next to nothing. I wonder if this is because of their experience and they’ve altered their methods or if the right player/deal hasn't been available.
They don’t seem to shop in similar markets to other Premier League sides, especially for ‘ready to explode’ talents. While I’m too lazy to scrape any data and look at it thoroughly, Ligue 1 seems a popular destination for Premier League clubs. But Bissouma is the only Ligue 1 signing Brighton have made. They’ve also never signed a player from the Italian Serie A. Bernardo is the only ‘ready to explode’ option from the Bundesliga, and they have none in this bracket from Portugal.
A part of me wonders if they deem these leagues as not representing value. Either because there’s more competition to drive up the price or the success rate of moves isn’t high enough to warrant the fee in most cases. If there’s a 40-50% chance a Ligue 1 winger works out, but he’ll cost ~€25m (the price of Kamaldeen Sulemana in January), could it be beneficial to instead invest in Trossard, Mitoma and Adringa for a combined ~€27m, spreading your bets but still having a possibly similar % pick in Trossard, and two more speculative options in Mitoma and Adringa? (I fear I'm not explaining this well, but it might be that they judge the gap between the quality of the Jupiler Pro League (and the likelihood of a performance transferring) and Ligue 1 as smaller than the gap in price/value of prospects in each division, making a ~€15m Jupiler Pro League player better value than a ~€25m Ligue 1 player if deemed comparable)Grouping the data for those between 22 and 25, the ‘ready to explode’ bracket, Brighton’s most frequented leagues were La Liga, the Jupiler Pro League, the Eredivisie and the Championship (these were the only leagues they signed more than one player from), which prompts some interesting questions.
Could La Liga be underrated for value? It tends to be a high standard, and Brighton have signed players from clubs who have reached the latter stages of European competition for < €20m.
Could the Championship be underrated for value? There’s a chance clubs are hesitant to invest in a Championship as it’s the second division, but what if the standard is comparable to a smaller European league, while there’s a smaller bridge to gap in style for the Premier League? That may not be true, but it’s possible the adaptation of going from the Championship to the Premier League could be smaller, especially depending on the team and player, than some European leagues. Brighton have even dipped back into the Championship to sign 21-year-old João Pedro from Watford for a club record €34.2m.
It’s hard to say they care about where very young players come from. They seem willing to take chances on young players playing regularly from most leagues. For signings aged 21 or younger, they’ve bought players from 16 (!) different leagues.
They’ve shown they are willing to spend on players in this bracket. Yves Bissouma and João Pedro fit the bill, but, given the leagues they come from, I’d place them more in the ‘ready to explode’ bracket/bought straight for the first-team, but you still have > €10m on two players from the Ekstraklasa and Julio Enciso from the Paraguayan league. Even including these (not João Pedro), the average fee for those 21 and under is just €5m, while the median is €4m.
Considering ~50% of their signings have been 21 and under, and they’ve made ~8 a season, they’re investing ~€20m a season into young prospects. That seems a manageable number for a Premier League and probably ~a first-team player. But, if they’re also being smart when picking up first-team players for cheap (Welbeck for free, Veltman for €1m), they get a first-team player and several young prospects for the same price as one or the other, their first-team can stay at an ~equal level, while they have a pipeline of young talent to develop and integrate over the length of the older players’ contracts who could improve the team should they develop as predicted. Again, this is different from someone like Leeds, where there didn’t feel like a pipeline but a bunch of kids thrown into a Premier League side.
Finally, it’s worth talking about how such an approach has been possible (point #4) and the perception of it (point #6). It’s probably easiest to break #4 down by sub-point.
Favourable factors that allow for their approach, namely:
A wide margin for error
Little expectation/short-term urgency (although that may be coming to an end)
Shorter pathway to the first team than some clubs
Premier League money
A growing reputation for their strategy (although this is an earned factor)
The first two points are similar and may sound harsh, but for most Premier League clubs outside the top six (and particularly those with lower wage bills), I’d argue there is a wide margin for error and little expectation.
I’d argue you can summarise it as relegation is a disaste, but anything else is mostly fine, or at least salvageable (given the opportunity for investment, thanks to the Premier League money).
I’m a Wolves fan and Wolves fit very comfortably into this bracket. Even after an underwhelming season with horrific underlying numbers, people aren’t too critical because we’re still in the Premier League. There’s always the belief a good window could propel you up the table. Not to mention, it's very close. If some fine margins swing your way in a couple of matches, you go from mid-table to teetering on Europe very quickly (see Wolves under Bruno Lage between December 2021 and ~February 2022).
Provided mistakes don’t compound, or unless you’re really going for broke, you can probably straighten things out. Brighton are an example of this with their early transfers not working out, but it’s not like they spent an unsustainable amount, placing all their eggs in one basket and backing themselves into a corner.
Then, since mid-table Premier League clubs are more likely to have worse players and less depth than the top sides, there seems a greater chance/short pathway for younger players to gain Premier League minutes. The more Premier League minutes they gain, the greater chance of them securing a big move or contract, and the more attractive a destination the club is.
The effect will snowball. If players see that moving to a club will help them gain a move to a top side to be a first-team player, the ‘stepping stone club’ will become an attractive proposition. From seeking out talented young players, it wouldn’t be surprising if the process reverses and young players hope they can attract the interest of Brighton, knowing they’ll look to develop them and there’s a chance they could make a big move to a top club in a couple of seasons.
Then, if that happens, Brighton look like geniuses. But this approach will make them look good outside of anything other than a disaster. Staying in the Premier League while spending less than a lot of other sides? You’ll get praise. Signing obscure talents for low fees and integrating them into the first team? You’ll get praise. Even if they fell backwards from here, say if they make another couple of big sales and finish ~midtable next season, they’d likely avoid criticism of regressing because people will be sympathetic to the fact they couldn’t hold on to their players.
However, you never see Brighton’s misses. If they sign some youngsters for < €10m and they don’t work out, no one will remind anyone about it. But if a top club spends a lot of money trying to improve their first team, and the player is a flop, everyone will jump on that fact. You’ll be constantly reminded of it. There’ll probably even be comparisons about how a club paid €xm for a player and Brighton only paid €6m for someone who’s deemed to be performing at a higher level.
You can compare the situation to creative work. If a producer makes ten hits in a year, they’re a genius. Then, when you sit down to make something, everything sounds awful in comparison. But 1) you never hear the experiments and rough drafts of the producer (you only see the hits, like with Brighton’s transfers) and 2) if you take the view that the producer is doing it for a job (eight hours a day) and it probably takes ~2 hours (possibly less) to get an idea down and sketched out, that’s 4 ideas a day. If they spend half the year generating ideas (and half experimenting/learning and polishing their ideas), that’s 26 weeks * 5 days a week * 4 ideas a day = 520 ideas. Producing 10 good songs from 520 ideas doesn’t seem all that difficult.
It doesn’t seem like it’s about Brighton being perfect, Brighton being right, or even being right more often than other clubs. I think it’s about giving themselves the most/best opportunities to be right or the highest probability to be right. If they sign five talented young players for a combined ~€25m, only one needs to become a regular first-team player for the approach to pay off. It’s much easier to be right 20% of the time than 100% of the time (like they would have to be if they just chucked that €25m on one first-team player).
It becomes easy to wonder: “Well, why don’t top clubs just do what Brighton do?” and it is surprising more don’t. However, there are perhaps a few reasons which link to the favourable factors for Brighton above:
A much smaller margin for error. If a top team misses out on the Champions League, it’s seen as a great tragedy. It won’t look good if a team is investing in kids and underperforms. It’ll be deemed as neglecting the present rather than prepping for the future. It seems like it can create shortsightedness at top clubs, where they’re happy to plaster over the cracks and do anything provided it lands them in the top four come the end of the season.
Perhaps less attractive for players, as there’s a lower chance of regular football, plus much higher stakes. To start for a top club, they need to be deemed the better option than someone likely one of the best in the world in their position, so they’re praying for either a generous coach or an injury crisis. Then, expectations are much higher, and there’s probably less patience, both internally and from fans. If a player can’t come in and perform in a high-pressure match right away, it’s unlikely they’ll be much use and possibly sent to loan purgatory.
A weaker reason, but there’s the possibility that when a big club comes calling, a smaller club could view it as a chance to drive up the price. You hear Manchester City are interested in a young player you value at €5m. Why not tell them it’s €10m or even €15m? What’s €5-10m to Manchester City? But from City’s POV, the deal probably goes from good value to not-so-good value.
Limitation breeds innovation/creativity. Brighton know they can’t compete with lots of clubs financially. They don’t have access to a certain bracket of players. If they wish to climb the league, they have to think outside the box and try to find a way to maximise their resources.
And so the opportunity is open for a side like Brighton to go in and be willing to take the risk on players. But the willingness to take the risk is admirable. Following their progress and seeing how they adapt to more success and European football will be interesting. Do they keep doing what they’re doing? Do they look to spend more and access a higher bracket of players?
I have pretty mixed feelings about their future, which I’ll try and summarise into some quick points:
I don’t think the kids were meant to play as much as they have this season. I don’t think Brighton expected to lose so many first-team players (White, Burn, Mwepu, Bissouma, Cucurella, Trossard and Maupay) across two seasons and, as a result, find themselves a bit short of peak age talent — especially if Mac Allister and Caicedo leave this summer too. And a part of me thinks there’s probably some surprise that they’ve done so well, considering how thin their squad has felt at times. It probably wasn’t expected that someone like Enciso would have such an immediate impact, for example.
With the above point in mind, it wouldn’t surprise me if Brighton added a couple of cheap older/peak-age options to the squad to bolster numbers, take some pressure off the kids and add depth for a season with more fixtures. The links with James Milner and Mahmoud Dahoud on frees point in this direction.
Thinking about it in a gambling model way, there’s a chance Brighton just keep doing what they’re doing, recognising there’ll be ups and down but, over the long-term, there’ll be better off.
When creating a gambling model and determining EV, you can experience some variance in your favour and go on a hot streak, having your bankroll grow by much more than expected in a given time. You can also have the opposite happen, seeing your backroll diminish when you should be counting your winnings. Over time you will expect everything to regress to mean.
Brighton have been through both in the Premier League now. The initial ‘ready to explode’ signings didn’t pay off, but Brighton didn’t abandon their strategy and had better fortune with Trossard, Maupay and Webster. Given point #1, I’d argue they’ve experienced a hot streak (in terms of players hitting the ground running, not xG) and should recognise that. With that in mind, they could probably keep doing what they’re doing, not feel the pressure to go out and make big money signings due to success, or splash out to replace outgoing players, instead continuing with their trusted strategy that has worked. But, they should do so knowing that it may not always result in European qualification, and rather than seeing that as a step backwards, it’s more part of the ebb and flow of their strategy.I'm horrible with any card game, but it feels like they've won big from a less than favourable hand, and that doesn't mean they should start raising their bets with other unfavourable hands or feel a need to start staking more. They can stick with their strategy, try and make +ve EV plays, and regularly re-assess.
João Pedro is a big fee, and given both their sales and European qualification, they may spend some more before the summer is over. But I’d be surprised if we see them pay lots for players in the 26-30 bracket to try and gain an instant impact and hang on to their European status.
How can teams try and mirror Brighton?
After typing so many words about what Brighton have done and comparing them to other Premier League clubs, it’s worth considering how a team can try and mirror Brighton’s approach. But first, a detour.
The Algorithm
Interestingly, you read the word algorithm more than data when reading about Brighton’s recruitment. When you hear a club is using data, you picture a loser like me hunched over a laptop, sorting a table or making a graph and then pointing at the screen to show someone else. When you hear the word algorithm, you picture your evil computer overlord telling you to sign these players for €xm or else.
De Zerbi has said the approach is different to what he’s known in the past and was happy to see his old recruitment guy leave because he wasn’t needed, thanks to our new computer overlords.
I can’t speculate about what Tony Bloom’s super secret algorithm could be. But I did have an idea for a way to model players and take an algorithmic approach, trying to think of it in terms of gambling and expected value, having a model suggest decisions/moves, rather than a human using data to aid their decision. Given Bloom’s history as a gambler, my line of thinking isn’t too out there, but it does involve a lot of variables and probably a significant amount of noise in its predictions. And is very likely nothing close to what they do.
Imagine you created a model that could scale a player’s output from league to league. Smarterscout employs a similar model to see performances relative to a given league. So, given historical data of players who have played in both leagues, perhaps combined with looking at things like team strength with a system like Elo/538’s SPI Ratings, you could model how much you’d expect a player to perform in a different league.
Taking Mitoma, for example, if he’s putting up >1 G + A per 90 in the J1 League, based on the strength of the league, his team relative to the league, and the strength of the teams he faces, you could try and predict how much G + A he’d put up in a variety of leagues (maybe even for a team of Brighton’s strength in the Premier League).
Then, you could also have a model that predicts transfer value. Taking in different inputs (age, nationality, league, team/league strength, contract length, previous fees, KPIs, and historical transfers), it could try and predict how much a player would be worth.
If you combine the two models, you could create a kind of expected value model and determine if a transfer is +ve or -ve EV.
Back to the Mitoma example, you could predict his figures in Japan would translate to x in the Premier League, y in La Liga, z in Belgium and so on. Then, you could predict his transfer value if he put up those figures in those leagues. If the transfer fee you believe you could get him for was less than the predicted value for his predicted figures in the different leagues, you could determine he’s both +ve EV and perhaps better value than a comparable player in a different league. To give an example with fake numbers off the top of my head:
Mitoma produces >1 G + A per 90 in Japan.
The performance model predicts he’ll produce ~0.45 - 0.60 per 90 in the Belgian league (it's a wide range, I know).
The value model predicts a 24-year-old who produces ~0.45 - 0.60 G + A per 90 in the Belgian League would cost ~€10-€18m (another wide range I know).
A 24-year-old in Belgium does produce ~0.45 - 0.60 G + A per 90 and is available for ~€15m.
Mitoma is available for ~€3m.
Given the model believes the two players are comparable (Mitoma would have a similar output in the same league) and the fee is significantly smaller for Mitoma, you could deem Mitoma +ve EV and make the deal.
You send Mitoma out on loan and test the model. If he does perform close to expected, it’s encouraging for the model and a good step in his development.
You bring Mitoma back and assess him for the first team. If he performs as expected based on his J1 League and Jupiler Pro League data points, you’re a genius. If not, he performed well in Belgium, so you sell him to a Belgian club for ~€3m-6m.
The same model could also be used for selling players. Thinking of Maupay as an example:
Brighton could determine a player with Maupay’s performance in the Premier League with a year left on his contract is worth €xm
A team is interested and is willing to pay >= €xm
You determine that’s better value than renewing his contract and paying him more. (You could even try and model this/your general wage structure. Is a player performing at his level and age worth €ym a year?)
You already have Welbeck performing at a similar level to Maupay. Undav is on loan in Belgium, and the model predicts his figures in the Premier League would be comparable to Maupay’s, and he’s on lower wages than Maupay’s renewal.
Sell Maupay and re-invest the fee into a young prospect (Enciso? João Pedro?) to bolster attacking options, with an eye to someone who can step up at the end of Welbeck’s contract.
<end of detour>
So, how can clubs be more like Brighton in the transfer market?
First, let’s consider chief executive and deputy chairman Paul Barber’s quote from the above article about Salvatore Monaco leaving.
“We’ve got a different process to a lot of clubs.
“What we don't do in the way that other clubs do is charge around the world, constantly watching matches looking at players, which is like trying to find a needle in a haystack.
“What we try and do is focus on the areas for improvement, focus on the players that we feel can fill that gap and then send our eyes, our scouts to look specifically at those players.
“We don't tend to do what some scouts do around the world, which is constantly circle the world looking.”
Sounds easy, doesn’t it?
Based on everything I’ve read, watched and thought when writing the above, I’d try and distil the approach down to this:
Identify needs
Yeah, it’s from the quote above. It didn’t require much thought from me, which is always a good thing. But it is understated. You'll often see a team buying a player and scratch your head wondering where they’ll fit in. It's odd to invest tens of millions of pounds on what feels like a hunch.
Go through each level of your team and identify the depth and quality. Find areas for improvement — either to first-team quality, depth or prospects.Identify players
Real groundbreaking stuff here, but it goes without saying you need to identify players. Find players in positions you’ve identified as requiring recruitment, performing actions you want players in those positions to perform. Don’t worry about age/league/value just yet. Just create a starting point. Build up a database of players that match the requirements.Assess your options
The last step was creation. Now we’re entering the curation stage. Work through your long list of players who meet performance thresholds, and determine viability and value. (Again if there was an algorithm that could determine how performance will transfer + transfer value, a lot of that work would be done for you).
I’d argue for a Premier League club in Brighton’s position, or those wishing to emulate them, a ‘ready to explode’ player is most desirable. These players are seen as a) good enough to start and b) still have room to grow. As this belief spreads, the demand and price for these players will go up, but I’d say they’re top of the hierarchy. From there, you could follow a simple pattern (although determining what is good value isn’t so simple):Assess ‘ready to explode’ options. If there’s a good value option available, great! Sign them up.
Wait, there’s no good value option available? Oh, man. Instead, try this:
Look for a peak age to older option who’s good enough for the role and is both cheap and content with a short contract on reasonable wages.
Look for a young prospect who’s playing regular minutes, meeting performance thresholds and represents good value. Sign one (maybe two depending on budget?) of these options.
Have the peak age to older option play the role until the end of their short contract and develop the younger option(s) through loans or managed minutes/youth games.
At the end of the contract, your young player(s) is(are) now in the ‘ready to explode’ bracket. If they’ve developed sufficiently and they’re ready for the first team, great! Chuck them in. What’s that? They’re not ready for the first team? Try this:
Depending on their progress and how much you value them, either cut your losses and sell them or continue their loan journey/development.
Return to a and start again. The market and players available would have changed by now.
PPPPPPP
The seven P’s, when only one is needed: prepare.
It seems interesting that Brighton didn’t loan out Mitoma and Undav in the year Maupay and Trossard entered the last year of their deals (although Trossard had a one-year extension option). It might be due to their age, but you wonder if the idea was these players could step up should Brighton lose their two attackers, then only dip into the market if these players didn’t deliver as expected/hoped or if they felt further improvement was required, without going into the market with clubs knowing they wanted to replace those players.
The idea gains some credence when considering Mitoma’s loan season in Belgium had a similar npG + A per 90 to Trossard’s last season with Genk, at a similar age but playing fewer minutes. It perhaps gives more strength to the idea that Mitoma could match Trossard’s production in the Premier League. Then, Undav’s last season in Belgium had similar figures to Maupay’s last season at Brentford — but Undav was a few years older.
Considering the Jupiler Pro League is one of Brighton’s most frequented leagues, you’d think they’d value the fact that these figures are comparable, and Mitoma and Undav were worth trying in the first-team given they had comparable figures to two players they were willing to spend upwards of a combined €30m on for players in the same/a similar league.
Considering Trossard didn’t leave in the summer and had the extension clause, there was little pressure on Mitoma. Then, Brighton had Welbeck producing more npxG + xA to Maupay already, Undav back from a productive season, and Evan Ferguson waiting in the wings. They didn’t have to dip into the market to proactively replace two of their key attackers because they’d pretty much already done it.
With this in mind and the previous point, there seems to be a clear pipeline and plan for player pathways at Brighton. They seem to sign young players who can enter the ‘ready to explode’ category for the end of a player’s contract or when they think they might sell a player. (Trossard → Mitoma? Maupay → Undav? Bissouma → Caicedo? Welbeck → Ferguson/João Pedro?)
Again, I think Brighton have sold more than they expected to in such a short period and find themselves short in some positions. They’ve lost two left-back options in Burn and Cucurella, with only Estupiñán an option currently. Then they’ve had little depth at right-back with Lamptey's injuries and have required midfielders to fill in there. It makes the links to James Milner make sense, able to cover both full-back positions and midfield, while it may also mean someone like Michal Karbownik stays at the club to be an understudy to Estupiñán. While those deals may not improve the first team, their lack of depth in those areas seems to have been solved without spending anything. They could instead invest in more prospects for a) when the more experienced players contracts run out or b) step up should they lose another first team player.Be willing to take risks and like a gamble
Like I’ve said before, Brighton are willing to take risks. The risks are likely very calculated, considering their data and algorithms, but they’re still willing to take them. Without taking such risks, they’d never reap the rewards.
In general, it feels like most transfers aim to minimise risk, and I’m not suggesting clubs should go out and chuck a bunch of money on a player because of a three-minute viral YouTube video, thinking they’ve got to take the risk and move before anyone else does. But, a Premier League club risking < €10m on a young prospect from a smaller league is quite a low-risk, high-reward option. Losses are negligible, but wins are potentially huge.
Looking at the leagues they’ve signed players from, Brighton look willing to take risks and believe they’ll pay off over time. Many other clubs wouldn’t. Even if they found a player through data, analysed video and scouted in person, but the player is playing in a tiny league that you can’t think of any big player coming from, you can imagine some clubs wouldn’t take the chance.
Then, despite the clear pathway to the first team and the preparation Brighton display, I also think they like a gamble. There’s no way every single player is signed with a very specific pathway in mind, but instead, because their performance and availability are too good to turn down. Even if Brighton weren’t in the market for a midfielder, but they find one who passes all the algorithm tests and is available for much cheaper than you’d expect, I feel like they’d sign them as a speculative gamble.
Again, it harkens back to seeking value rather than just good young players. If you can get a player who can perform at x level much cheaper than you’d expect to, surely that’s something you’ve got to explore?
It’s not going to be this easy to implement a successful transfer strategy. Things can go against you even if you feel you are doing right. I’ve written a lot of it in an annoying tone (that’s just for my amusement), but recruitment is a huge part of football, and it feels like just implementing some kind of basic strategy or plan (even thinking about a simple idea like an OODA loop for assessing each position, and then creating a depth pathway/pipeline) goes a long way. You don't have to find the next wonderkid for peanuts every year, but trying to implement something just to minimise stupid/obvious mistakes seems like it'd be upwards of ~50% of the work.
Aren’t you finished yet?
Let’s try and wrap this up…
Every few years, it seems a team comes along and does something different, winning lots of praise and sparking imitation, and then either the trend fades, or teams adapt, and the advantage is gone, or they sell their best players and can't replace them with similar-level talent. It makes it fun to see how a) Brighton will continue after having such a successful season and b) how other teams will try and copy what Brighton have done and the varying results that will follow.
Epilogue: Alternative Pathways
Something I’ve thought for a while, which resurfaced when writing this: Given the wide availability of data and video, any player who performs well at almost any club/level will likely be on the radar of plenty of clubs. You wonder if it means more players will move from established sides and ‘drop down’ for the dual benefit of senior minutes, plus the opportunity to showcase their abilities at the senior level and grab the attention of bigger clubs. Would a club be more likely to gamble on a 19-year-old playing senior football at a lower level than them or one playing U23 football?
One example could be Dani Olmo. Olmo came through at Barcelona but moved to Dinamo Zagreb for regular football. He did well at Zagreb. He gained minutes at a young age, including in continental competitions, and eventually earned a move to RB Leipzig. Could more players make similar decisions, opening alternative pathways to top-level clubs?